A BRSR Walkthrough: Ambuja Cements, FY 2025-26

    A step-by-step reading of a real BRSR: Ambuja Cements' filing for FY 2025-26. What the workforce, safety, energy, emissions, water and related-party data show, the effect of two mergers on the numbers, and the questions an analyst would ask. Educational, not investment advice.

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    Gajji Srinath, Founder, The Valuation Node

    Published 10 min read
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    A cement plant with tall silos behind grassland

    Key takeaway

    A step-by-step reading of a real BRSR: Ambuja Cements' filing for FY 2025-26. What the workforce, safety, energy, emissions, water and related-party data show, the effect of two mergers on the numbers, and the questions an analyst would ask. Educational, not investment advice.

    Before you read this: Reading a BRSR: an analyst's checklist, BRSR: a section-by-section guide, BRSR Core: the KPIs and assessment or assurance

    Intuition

    This walkthrough applies the twelve-step BRSR reading method to one real filing: Ambuja Cements' Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report for FY 2025-26, filed on 30 May 2026. Ambuja is one of India's largest cement makers and part of the Adani group.

    The aim is not to judge the company but to show how to read the data: calculate ratios, compare with the previous year, check boundaries and definitions, and turn surprises into questions. All figures are from the company's BRSRs for FY 2025-26 and FY 2024-25 and its FY 2024-25 ESG goals page. Ratios marked "calculated" are worked out from those figures.

    Mechanics

    Step 1: boundary

    The FY 2025-26 BRSR is on a standalone basis and includes Sanghi Industries and Penna Cement Industries after their mergers. Subsidiaries and joint ventures are excluded. This matters for every comparison below: the company reporting in FY 2025-26 is much larger than the one reporting in FY 2024-25.

    Step 2: workforce

    ItemFY 2025-26FY 2024-25
    Permanent employees3,8673,007
    Women among permanent employees121 (3.13%)96 (3.19%)
    Permanent workers889876
    Women among permanent workers5 (0.56%)5 (0.57%)
    Women on the board1 of 81 of 8
    Turnover, permanent employees25.53%26.20%
    Turnover, permanent workers0.79%14.57%

    Gender diversity is very low, as is common in cement. The fall in worker turnover from 14.57% to 0.79% is large and worth asking about.

    Step 3: safety

    ItemFY 2025-26FY 2024-25
    LTIFR, employees (per million person-hours)0.080.31
    LTIFR, workers0.550.44
    Fatalities, employees00
    Fatalities, workers32
    Spending on well-being (share of revenue)₹56.77 crore (0.23%)₹51.94 crore (0.28%)

    Employee safety improved, but worker LTIFR rose and three workers died. As usual in heavy industry, the risk sits with workers rather than office staff.

    Step 4: energy and emissions

    ItemFY 2025-26FY 2024-25
    Total energy (GJ)11,16,91,8537,24,94,325
    Renewable energy (GJ)67,40,29961,87,752
    Renewable share of total energy (calculated)6.0%8.5%
    Scope 1 emissions (tCO2)2,25,94,6121,47,56,978
    Scope 1 intensity (kg CO2 per tonne of cementitious material)595537
    Scope 2 intensity (kg CO2 per tonne of cementitious material)18.517
    Energy intensity (GJ per tonne of cementitious material)2.92.6

    Energy use rose 54% and Scope 1 emissions 53% (both calculated), mainly because the merged plants are now included. More telling is intensity: Scope 1 per tonne rose by about 11% (calculated), so the merged business is more carbon-intensive per tonne. Against the company's 2030 target of 440 kg per tonne, the gap has widened.

    Note the definitions. The FY 2024-25 ESG goals page reported 28% "renewable and green energy consumption", while the BRSR shows renewables at 8.5% of total energy that year (calculated). The 28% figure appears to refer to a narrower base such as electricity. Both can be correct; they measure different things.

    Step 5: water

    ItemFY 2025-26FY 2024-25
    Water withdrawal and consumption (kilolitres)36,68,28747,03,097
    Of which harvested rainwater17,12,899 (46.7%, calculated)Not shown in extract
    Water intensity (litres per tonne of cementitious material)97172
    Water dischargedZeroNot shown in extract

    Withdrawal equals consumption, consistent with zero discharge. Almost half of the FY 2025-26 withdrawal is harvested rainwater, which explains much of the fall in intensity. That is a genuine practice, but comparisons with peers should check whether they count rainwater the same way.

    Step 6: openness of business (BRSR Core)

    ItemFY 2025-26FY 2024-25
    Related-party share of purchases34%36%
    Related-party share of sales29%23%
    Loans and advances to related parties (share of total)99.59%99.76%
    Accounts payable days8937
    Sales through dealers and distributors68%70%
    Top 10 dealers' share of dealer sales4%4%

    Related parties account for about a third of purchases and a rising share of sales, which is expected in a large group but makes the pricing and approval of those deals important. Payable days more than doubled, which deserves an explanation.

    Step 7: assurance

    BRSR Core received reasonable assurance from SGS India for FY 2025-26, and other parameters limited assurance, under ISAE 3000 (Revised) and ISAE 3410. In FY 2024-25, the provider was TÜV India, also with reasonable assurance on BRSR Core. A change of provider is not a problem in itself, but it is worth noting.

    Questions an analyst would ask

    1. How much of the rise in Scope 1 intensity comes from the merged plants, and what is the plan and capex to bring them to group standards?
    2. What caused the three worker fatalities, and what changed afterwards?
    3. Why did worker turnover fall so sharply?
    4. On what terms are related-party purchases and sales priced, and how does the audit committee review them?
    5. Why did accounts payable days rise from 37 to 89?
    6. How is harvested rainwater measured, and how much of the water improvement comes from it?

    Advanced details

    Mergers break trend lines. When a company absorbs other businesses, absolute figures jump and intensities can move in either direction. Ask for like-for-like figures for the old business, or restate the prior year if the company provides the data.

    Different documents, different bases. BRSR figures, sustainability report figures and website ESG goals can use different boundaries and definitions. Note the source of each number in your own analysis.

    Carbon costs. Cement is covered by India's carbon credit trading scheme. Plant-level emission intensity against CCTS targets will decide whether the merged plants add certificate costs. That needs plant-level data, which the BRSR does not provide.

    Context, not a verdict. A single BRSR shows where to look. A full view needs peer comparison, the annual report, plant-level disclosures and management's answers.

    Common mistakes

    • Comparing years without checking the boundary. The FY 2025-26 figures include merged businesses.
    • Taking a headline renewable share at face value. Check whether it refers to electricity or to all energy.
    • Reading water intensity without the source mix. Rainwater harvesting changes the picture.
    • Treating BRSR data as a judgement. It is evidence for questions, not an answer.

    Key terms

    Sources

    Sources

    Figures and claims come from the sources named in the text: company filings, exchange disclosures, and rating agency reports, as cited. See the editorial philosophy for how sources are chosen.

    Cite this article

    Gajji, S. (2026). "A BRSR Walkthrough: Ambuja Cements, FY 2025-26." The Valuation Node. https://valuationnode.com/analysis/esg-analysis/brsr-walkthrough-ambuja-cements

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    Educational analysis, not investment advice. The author may hold positions in securities discussed; where relevant, this is stated above. See the disclaimer.

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    Gajji Srinath

    Founder of The Valuation Node. MBA candidate at NIT Rourkela.

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